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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent, /
" Case No.
I
10559

vs.

MELVIN CANFIELD,

Appellant,

\

I

i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
The Appellant, Melvin Canfield, was arrested on
the 14th day of May, 1965, for murdering Douglas
Holland of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 10th day of
.Hay, 1965. The Appellant was arraigned before the
Salt Lake City Court and charged with :Murder in the
First Degree, together with two codefendants, Ted
HillleLrande and Gordon Adamson. On the 28th day of
J

June, 1965, the deposition of Dr. James R. :Miller was
taken in open court in the Salt Lake City Court, anrl
the Preliminary Hearing for the Appellant and eodefendant, Gordon Adamson, commenced the 1st dar
of July, 1965. During the Preliminary Hearing, a11 ct
upon motion of the Salt Lake County Attorney, the
charges against Gordon Adamson were dismissed. The
State presented ten witnesses. The defense presented
no evidence. After arguments of counsel, the Appellant
was bound over to stand trial in the Third Judicial
District Court on the reduced charge of Murder in the
Second Degree.

1

On July 12, 1965, the Appellant was arraigned
in the Third Judicial District Court, charged by Infor·.
mation of the crime of l\'lurder in the Second Degree, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 30, Sections 1 and 3.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. A plea of
not guilty was entered.
The trial was held and heard by jury with the
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, District Judge, presid·
ing, on the 27th day of September, 1965. The jury
rendered a verdict of guilty of Second Degree :Murder.
The Defendant was sentenced the 7th day of October
1965, to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for an '
indeterminate term. The commitment issued forthwith.
The appeal of the Appellant is taken from the
rulings of the Court.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the 10th day of l\'Iay, 1965, at approximately
9 o'clock p.m. the Appellant and three others drove to
the office of the deceased, Douglas Holland, at 649
South Fifth East, Salt Lake City, Utah (R260, 317,
:J24, 392, 393) to collect payment for the clothes of
Appellant that the deceased had maliciously ripped and
destroyed the day before. (Exhibits 30, 31 and R398,
317, 323, 418, 403.) Immediately upon their arrival the
father of the deceased, Ben Holland, came out of the
office onto the lawn, approached the car, and told the
Appellant and the others in the car, "You guys better
clear out of here or you're going to be in real trouble."
(R262, 317, 395, 425.) Within seconds thereafter the
deceased, Douglas Holland, came out of the office onto
the porch, with a shotgun in hand, and without any
warning shot at the Appellant. (R263, 270, 318, 325,
B95, ·125.) The Appellant ducked down in the car to
amid being shot (R394, 396, 398, 425) and raised up
, to look and saw the deceased pump a new shell into the
firing chamber of the shotgun and aim it at Appellant
to shoot again. (R396, 426, 399.) Simultaneously, the
Appellant saw a rifle being pushed up by Gordon
Adamson from the back seat of the car. (R263, 270, 2il, 396, 426.) Appellant took the gun, put a shell in
the chamber and fired at the legs of the deceased (R396,
, +26-427, 436) to "either scare him or wound him to
preYent him (the deceased) from shooting me." (R400,
+27, 428.) The Appellant backed the car out of the
:lrireway and drove away from the office of the deceased.
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(R264, 397.) As he was driving away, the deceased
fired a second shot at the Appellant. (R265, 326, 39i.)
The victim died the next morning ( RIOI).
Appellant contacted his attorney by phone and
made arrangements to turn himself in to the police
voluntarily (R410). The Appellant's attorney went to
meet the Appellant but upon his arrival he found the
police :were present and had placed the Appellant under
arrest (R411).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF MURDER IN
THE SECOND DEGREE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVER
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION A.NU
ADJ\1ITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OYER· ·
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION A.rm
REFUSING ADMITTANCE OF EVIDENCE
OF THE DECEASED'S CHARACTER A~D
4

FOR VIOLENCE IN SUPPORT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

lU~PU'J'ATION

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIYlNG AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF MURDER IN
THE SECOND DEGREE.
The Appellant contends that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt and present evidence
~11ff icicnt to sustain the verdict of Murder in the Second
Degree. Title 76, Chapter 30, subsection I, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended, defines murder as follows:
-~Iurder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought.''
Title 76, Chapter 30, subsection 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, defines the degrees of murder
as follows:
"Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying
in wait or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpe-
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trate, any arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or
perpetrated from a premeditated design 1111 •
lawfully and maliciously to effect the death of
any human being other than the one who is
killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly daugerous to th_e lives of others and evidencing a
depraved mmd, regardless of human life ;-i~
murder in the first degree. Any other homicide
committed under such circumstances as would
have constituted murder at common law is rnurder in the second degree." (Emphasis added.)
"Murder at common law is the killing of one
human being by another with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, i.e. with
deliberate intent or formed design to do so."
26 American Jurisprudence 161 Section 11 and
cases cited thereunder. Section 12 of the same
citation points out the common law distinction
between murder and other grades of homicide.
"Felonious homicide at common law is divided
into murder and manslaughter. The element
which distinguishes murder from manslaughter
OJ marks the boundary between the two grades
of homicide, i.e. is malice. Unless there is a killing with malice there can be no murder of any
degree. Lacking this element the offense is nothing higher than manslaughter . . . "

1

1

~

The trial court instructed the jury in Instruction
No. 16 (R55) that six elements had to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt before the Appellant could be con· '
victed of murder in the second degree. The elements
listed were: ( 1) that the Appellant killed Douglas
Holland on May 10, 1965; (2) that the killing was with
malice aforethought; ( 3) that the Appellant intended
to kill Douglas Holland or that the Appellant intended
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to do great bodily harm to Douglas Holland which
resulted in death; ( 4) that the killing was unlawful; ( 5)
that the killing was felonious; and ( 6) that said Douglas
Holland died within one year. The Instruction further
,tated,
"If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the State has proved each and all of the
allegations of the Information as summarized
above, then it is your duty to convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree.
If, on the other hand, you believe from the evidence that the State has not proved one or more
of the said elements beyond a reasonable doubt
then you should find the defendant not guilty of
the crime of murder in the second degree."
The Trial Court in Instruction 13a ( R5 I)
instructed the jury: "The term 'malice aforethought' means pre-existing malice. 'Malice'
means that condition of mind which prompts
a person t9 do a wrongful act intentionally,
without justification or excuse . . ." (Emphasis
added).
" 'Malice' may be express or implied. It is express where there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of or cause
great bodily injury to a fellow creature. It is
implied when no considerable provocation appears or when the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned or malignant heart."
Immediately upon the arrival of Appellant and
three others at the office of the deceased, the father of
the deceased came out on the lawn, approached the car
:md advised the Appellant and others in the car, "You
7

guys better clear out of here or you're going to be in
real trouble. (R262, 317, 395, 425.) Within second~
thereafter the deceased came out onto the porch and
without warning fired a shotgun at the Appellant.
(R263, 270, 318, 325, 395, 425.) The evidence shows
that the shot hit the lawn but that it was in a direct line
from the porch to the car in which the Appellant was
sitting. (See Exhibits P-3 and P-21.) The Appellant
saw the deceased pump the shotgun, putting a shell into
the firing chamber, and swing the gun around, pointing
it at the Appellant to shoot a second time. (R396, 399,
426.) Gordon Adamson found a rifle in the back seat
of the car ( R289) and handed it up to the Appellant.
( R263, 270-271, 396, 426.) The Appellant took the
rifle, seeing it for the first time (R403), and testified, '
"I fired at him to save my life to prevent him from
shooting me . . . to scare him or to wound him to stop
him from shooting me." (R400, 427, 428.) The Appel·
lant backed out of the driveway from the off ice of the
deceased. (R397) As the Appellant was driving away,
the father of the deceased pointed the gun at the car
and attempted to shoot the Appellant (R397); then
handed the gun to the deceased who fired the shotgun a
second time at the Appellant. (R265, 326, 397.)
It is submitted that the evidence wholly fails to :
support a finding that the State proved beyond a reason·
able doubt three of the necessary six required elements ·
of second degree murder as set out in the Trial Court's
Instruction No. 16 ( R55) . There is no evidence in tbr
record from which "malice aforethought" could be con·
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eluded. ".Malice" as defined by the Court's Instruction
No. 13a in this case could not be "express" nor "implied." ( R5 l)
The only evidence in the record which in any way
touches upon the Appellant's state of mind is the testimony of the Appellant which completely negates a
finding of malice. The very circumstances surrounding
the shooting itself preclude a finding that the Appellant
acted with malice aforethought or that he had malice as
defined by the Trial Court. The Appellant, knowing
the vicious nature of the deceased (R413, 415, 416)
and knowing the deceased had threatened to "kill you
(Appellant) if I ever see you again" (R436, 386) returned the shot of the deceased only after the deceased
had shot at him and "was pumping the gun and turning
back around and facing the car again and pointing the
gun at the car." (R399, 426, 396.) It should be remembered that the deceased fired a second shot at the Appellant. (R265, 326, 397.)
Malice could not be express as defined by the
Instruction of the Court because the Appellant under
the circumstances of the shooting could not have formed
''a deliberate intention." Malice could not be "implied"
as defined by the Court because to be implied there must
be "no considerable provocation." This Court defines
and adopts a definition of provocation in the case of
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 Pac. 2d 738 in
11·hich this Court refers to a 'i\Tisconsin case Ryan v.
State, 115 'i\Tisc. 488, 92 Northwest 271, wherein the
l'Onrt said:
9

" .. : A learne~ text writer speaki~g upon
the subject, says: In general, provocation con·
sists in circumstances of such nature as are calculated to produce and do produce, such excitement and passion as might obscure the reason of
an ordinary man and render him liable to do the
act which causes the homicide . . . The provocation should be sudden and sufficiently great,
-that is, calculated to exasperate both in its
character and in respect to the person to whom
it is directed . . . ' "
It is urged that nothing could be more provocation than
the deceased's shooting at the Appellant after threatening to kill the Appellant, especially where Appellant ·
was aware of the vicious nature of the deceased. (R413,
415.) The instantaneous reaction of the Appellant when,
without warning, he was shot at by the deceased (R318, ;
325, 395, 425), and the Appellant's evidenced intention
to save his own life (R400, 427), his reaction out of fear
for his life (R428), and the threat of death from the
deceased ( R4 l 7) , when combined eliminate the finding
of malice or malice aforethought as required to find the
Appellant guilty of murder in the second degree.

This Court has held in the case of State v. Thompson, no Utah 113, 170 Pac. 2d 153, referring to the
case of State v. Russell, 106 Utah ll6, 145 Pac. 2d
1003, and quoted, "Thus there can be no murder, either
in the first or second degree, without a planned designed
or thought out beforehand intention to kill or cause
great bodily injury, or to do an act knowing that the
natural and probable consequences thereof would be t(I
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cause death or great bodily injury to some other person,
11 r to commit certain types of felonies. Anything less does

not have malice aforethought."
The only evidence at the trial from which to determine whether or not the defendant acted with malice
is that of the Appellant. The Appellant testified why he
went to the home of the deceased, " ... somebody suggested that we go up there to see Doug (the deceased)
and see if he wanted to pay for my (the Appellant's)
clothes that he tore up" (R398). The Appellant further
testified:
Q. Now, when you were talking about collecting from Doug Holland on these clothes, are
these the clothes you are referring to? (displaying exhibits 30 and 31. R403).

A. Yes.
Q. 'Vhat did you intend to collect?

A. Money.

•

•

•

When asked by the District Attorney on cross
examination, the Appellant testified (R418) :
Q. What did you go up to his (deceased)
house for then?

A. To ask him if he would pay for my clothes .

•

•

•

Q. 'Vhy did you get three to go with you?

A. I was afraid of him.

11

As to the intention or the state of mind of the ,
Appellant at the time of the shooting, the only evidence
again is that of the Appellant. He testified (R400):

Q. I see. What did you feel the exact time he
fired?
A. I was scared.
Q. Scared of what?

A. Scared of losing my life.

Q. And at the time that you had the gun and
you fired at him, what were you thinking?

i

A. I was thinking maybe I could stop him
from shooting at me again if I shot by him or
wounded him.
Q. I want you to listen carefully to this ques·
tion. At the time you fired did you intend to
kill Doug Holland?

1

A. No, I did not.
Q. What did you intend to do?

A. To either scare him or wound him to pre·
vent him from shooting me.
The testimony is that the Appellant aimed low
(R427), aimed at the deceased's legs (R426) and fur·
ther testified on cross examination (R428) as follows:
Q. Isn't it true that you went up there tu
fight him?

A. No, it is not.
Q. Now you knew you had hit him in the hip
or leg, didn't you?

12

1

1

1

A. I thought I ha<l hit hirn in the leg.
(~.

\ Vha t made you

t~ink

that?

A. Because I pointed the gun low.

(-J,. Didn't you think if you just shot anothu·
shot back that he wouldn't shoot bad.;: at ym~ ~
A. I didn't know what he would do. Like l
sai<l, it· .was just instantaneous and that was the
only thing that come into my mind to stop him
from shooting me.
(~. You knew this wasn't any self defense at
that time, don't you?

A. I was doing it to save my life is ·what I was
doing it for.

*

*

*

Q. Of self defense?
A. This is the way it's been all along. That's
the only reason I fired a shot was to saye my life.
This Court has been uniform in holding that a
liomil'ide is justifiable if there exists in the mind of the
~layer reasonable belief of the necessity of the killing.
::-iee the cases of State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 18G
P 108, 25 ALR 497, and State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331,
Hl!J P 145. See also 'Varren on Homicide, Vol. 3, 322
and paragraph 314, page 588 and notes thereunder.
In (Escussina
the necessarv
elements of self-defense
b
.J
a~ .i11stif)'ing a homicide, this Court held in the concur1i11g opinion of State v. Law, lOG Utah 196, 147 P2d
13

* * * The element of self defense, or justifiable homicide, is predicated upon two proposi·
tions: (a) That the circumstances and surroundings were such that a man might reasonably be·
lieve he was in imminent fear of death or great
bodily injury. (b) That the actor did beliere e
he
. .was in imminent peril of death or great bodily. ti
mJury.
I
•

•

•

" * * * but under statutes such as ours, the
decisions have modified this rule, and it is now
generally held that a homicide is justifiable if
accused acted as a reasonable man with appar·
ent good cause for shooting. (cases cited) ; the
necessity for horr~cide need not be real but need
be only reasonably apparent, that is, based upon
reasonable grounds of belief that such is the
case. (case cited) * * * "
Sec. 76-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, reads:
"Homicide is also justifiable when committed
by any person in the following cases:

( l) When resisting any attempt to murder
any person, or to commit a felony or to do some
great bodily injury upon any person.
( 3) When committed in the lawful defense
of such person * * * when there is reasonable
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felon~·
or to do some great bodily injury and there is
imminent danger of such design being accom·
plished * * * "

Sec. 76-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. ai
amended, reads:
14

1
f

"''Then the homicide appears to be justifiable
or excusable, the person charged must, upon his
trial, be fully acquitted and discharged."
It is submitted that the State failed to present
cridence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Appellant was guilty of Murder in the Second
Degree, and that the Appellant acted in self-defense.
The trial court should have directed a verdict of J ush·
fiable Homicide and acquitted the Appellant.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION AND
ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
The testimony which the trial court erred in admitting was a purported telephone conversation received
by the deceased several hours prior to the shooting,
allegedly from one Gordie Adamson, not the Appellant
(R253). The only testimony of the call was that of the
father of the deceased, which was admitted over the
objection of the Appellant. The father testified to parts
of conversation overheard from the deceased, as follows:
(By Mr. Banks) (R253-254).

Q. So, now, at this time I want to ask you as
nearly as you can recall just what your son said
into the phone at that time.
A. "No, but how about starting with you?"
and then there was a pause and, "You are doing
a lot of talking. Who am I talking to? Gordie,

15

Gordie who? Gordon Adamson." And tht
there was some conversation I didn't get ai
he didn't say anything. It ran for a little whil
and then he said: "It doesn't make any differ
ence who can lick who but one way or anotht:
something has got to be done to stop this makill'·
a hangout of my home." And then there was mt
much said then for a little while and the11:
"'Vipe me out, huh? Just where are you? 12J1;
Pacific A venue, huh? How long are you goin1
to be there? How about meeting you there i1
thirty minutes?" And that was about all that I
recall."
11

The trial judge admitted the testimony under th(
"state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule offered
by the state supposedly to show the state of mind ul
the deceased and not for the truth of the matter asserteu
within the statement (R253).
It is submitted that this testimony should not hare
been admitted under the "state of mind" exception or
any other exception because ( l) the alleged telephom
call was not made by the Appellant, (2) the testimom
is not trustworthy enough for the jury to consider, anJ
( 3) any probative value it might have had was far out·
weighed by the extremely prejudicial nature of the
hearsay statements.
Appellant's first contention is that the requiremeub
for admissibility under the "state of mind" exception
have not been met. It was encumbent upon the state It:
lay a proper foundation showing the alleged phone call
was relevant to the matters in issue. 26 Am. J ur . .tn1
The state of mind of the deceased is in issue onl~· ~,
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it relates to the Appellant. The authorities agree that
the proper foundation for making threats by a third
person relevant consists of proving, by independent
testimony, that ( 1) the accused had knowledge of the
threat at the time of the shooting, and ( 2) that the
particular person who made the threat was closely connected with the crime; otherwise, it is inadmissible.
State v. Smith, 115 Wash. 405, 197 Pac. 770; Karnes
v. Comm., 125 Va. 758, 99 S.E. 562, 4 ALR 1509, 40
C.J.S. Sec. 238.

Appellant submits that the record is wholly void
of any proof that the accused was aware of the alleged
phone call. The prosecution failed to lay any proper
foundation before or after the admittance of the hearsay in question to show the accused was aware of a
threat or phone call to the deceased. The Appellant
denies all knowledge of any phone call and this goes
uncontradicted throughout the trial. ( R398-399) .
The prosecution failed to establish any foundation
that the particular person who made the call was closely
connected with the crime charged. The trial court overlooked the fact that there was no admissible proof whatsoever to establish who made the phone call. The identity
of the caller rests solely on the basis of the double hearsay evidence admitted. The state introduced no independent testimony to prove Gordie Adamson made a telephone call to the deceased. Gordie Adamson himself
was not called by the state to testify. The only evidence
tl1at Gordie Adamson was the name of the caller comes

17

from the admitted hearsay testimony. The declarant
himself had no first-hand knowledge of who was on the
other end of the phone. The deceased's declarations
were based on hearsay because he had no personal know].
edge whatever as to the real identity of the caller. Tht
trial court allowed this hearsay evidence to be the basi\
for further hearsay testimony of the father resulting
in double hearsay. The state of mind exception may be
valid to admit that which the declarant had first-hand
knowledge over or evidences his own intention, Sine
v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, 118 Utah 415, but not
that which is hearsay to the declarant himself. Had the
trial court excluded the name of the alleged caller, as
hearsay, then the record failed to prove who made the
phone call. vVithout such proof, the foundational re·
quirement of connecting the person who made the call
with the accused wholly fails therefore none of the
telephone testimony would be admissible. On the same
principle it has been held that a threatening anonymous
letter was inadmissible because it was not sufficiently
connected with the accused. Karr v. State, 100 Ala.
4, 14 So. 851.
The Appellant further contends that the declara·
tions which the father attributed to the deceased are
too untrustworthy to qualify as credible evidence. People
v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 362 P.2d 473 (191311.
In addition to the hearsay admissions there are other
factors casting doubt upon the credibility of this testi·
mony. The only testimony as to the contents of the call
or to the fact that deceased received a phone call is the

18

dcccased's father. The prosecution made no attempt
to corroborate even the fact that a call was made. Here
the jury can only speculate as to the real import of the
\\'ords and effect on the deceased. Part of the phone
ronrersation testified to was "Wipe me out, huh" (R~j;j). The jury is left on their own to speculate as to
what constitutes a "wipe out." Without some corroboration from an independent witness testifying as to what
the deceased himself thought the caller meant, words
such as "wipe me out, huh" are too speculative and the
actual state of mind of the declarant is too undetermined
leaving the jury entirely on their own to guess.
Because of his relationship with the deceased, the
father's competence as a witness should be examined
carefully to determine the credibility and trustworthiness of this testimony. The witness was unable to follow
instructions and was admonished several times by the
judge to not give his own opinion or repeat the words
of the deceased. (R254, 256, 259-260, 261). The witness was obviously prejudiced and biased against the
Appellant. The· father's testimony evidences a poor
memory. (R267-268, 271-272, 273, 277, 280). Yet
he testified with astounding accuracy as to the alleged
exact utterances by his son and even includes names and
addresses which prior to the phone call were foreign to
him ( R2.53), even though heard under extreme circumstances.
Appellant further contends that the hearsay evirlenee was inadmissible because it was extremely prejnflicial. It has been ruled in both state courts and the
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C.S. Supre-me Cr_Jurt that adnittance r:d ex:remtiy !<
judicial he~,r-,ay is trrrJf whtn tLe probat:-:;-e ,-alut
the tb tirnony is i'ar •-:iut\\-eig11ed by tLe prej ud:c:al na:~
of the hearsay statements. Shepherd '· C. S .. :?80 r.
96 '193:3 : People '· HamJton, 55 Cal. :2d S~l. .:;
P.2d -±73 '19t31 : People'· P~s. 56 Cal. :?d !:1a. :}·
P.2d 713 ( 19611.
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It is submitted. that the dariger wi~en Learsa: st2: t
ments are admitted to show c1nly the dedarant's s:ate
mind and the testimony is explosi•e ii na:ure is t[_ 2
an untrained and inexperienced jury cannc•: p•:'";t,
disentangle the state of mind from the rru:h or '.'. I
accusations. The trial court admouished :te JlL1: l
technical language that:

• •

··... the answer gi•en is not prorfered by :nt ~'a
to proYe the truth oi the tacts contaiied ~:h:.n the sta::
ment that ,,-ill IlL•w be made but as e---:dence ·~·i thin:
that "-ere said of the condition and state c•i r:rind c1I :_
deceased at the time when these sbtemen':s were nua'
, R.:?53 . It is submitted th:1t no b,,
. mi:.d ~s CJPJ~
,
in the present case. The s:a:emen:s :::mc•Wl: :·~ r\m·e:_
accns~1tiL•ns by :1 man s:nce d~e:"?.sed and re?::::rdles' ·
the admL)niL.m fr(im tb-o tr::il c"-•ur:. ··H.__'w c.:::.r. :Ls jur
:lYl•id the ·ren:Tbtr:1f11g cL~ng l•;:' :b.,se aQ':.:s.:::.::·:·D' r';l·:
the ~r:n-e· ... Pe,,_-'!1le ,-. H:1:11J:~·~:. 55 C:.:.l. :2:1 SSL :3r.
P.:2d -17~~ , H)tH .
The _-\.ppell:mt st:t>m::s :L:.: :l-:_0
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rnin<l. There is ample testimony in the record by the
father from his personal observations that the deceased
was nenous, excited, and agitated after the telephone
call. (R25!J, 254). His subsequent actions sufficiently
<lemoustrated the deceased's state of mind. The hear~ay statements in question added nothing to that which
could not be sufficiently established by the father's
first han<l observations. "Under such circumstances,
where the true evidentiary bearing of the evidence is
at best slight and remote, and yet the evidence is of
a nature such as to make it very prejudicial to the
party against whom it is offered, the evidence should
be excluded." Estate of Anderson, 185 Cal. 700, 719,
198 Pac. 407, 415.
The Appellant submits that the court was erroneous in overruling Appellant's objection and admitting
the hearsay evidence which resulted in great prejudice
against the Appellant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRCLING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION AND
REFUSING ADMITTANCE OF EVIDENCE
OF THE DECEASED'S CHARACTER AND
REPCTATION FOR VIOLENCE IN SUPPORT OF SELF-DEFENSE.
The Appellant made a proffer of proof to present
tndcnce of several witnesses to testify about certain
;11~tances demonstrating the violent and vicious nature
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of the deceased. The Trial Court ruled that the evidenr
was of the nature that would fall within an exceptio:
of the hearsay rule but further ruled that the evidern,
of the trial at that time was not sufficient to meet th
foundational requirements for such evidence (R44f
450). Appellant contends the Trial Court's ruling wa
in error.
The general rule with regard to evidence of 111·
violent and vicious nature of the deceased is set out i1
121 ALR 390 and the numerous cases listed then
under:

"'Vhere there is some evidence of self defem·
the defendant was allowed to introduce evidem
as to unlawful acts of violence by the decease1
against the defendant and other persons, if prio
to the homicide defendant knew of these act,
either through his own observation or througl
communication with others.
"The majority of the jurisdictions held tha a
this type of evidence bears on the questiuc
whether the defendant was reasonably apprt
hensive of danger of his life."
J

Jones v. State, 83 So. 2d 68, Alabama.
"Evidence of the violent, turbulent, blooo
thirsty, dangerous character is received for th1
purpose of illustrating or explaining the circuru
stances of the killing, or to give meaning to con
duct of the deceased, * * * or to justify a resor
to more prompt measure of self preservation.
Demsey v. State, 266 SW2d 875, Court of Crin
Appeals.
"In murder prosecution in which defendai
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claimed he acted in self defense defendant could
properly testify as to any act of violence or conviction therefor by the deceased of which defendant had knowledge at the time of the homicide-and to any information or report of such
act or conviction which had been communicated
or made known to him before the killing; such
evidence being admissible upon the question of
defendant having a reasonable apprehension of
death or serious bodily injury."

State v. Finn, 243 SW2d 67.
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"\Vhere the evidence supports the defense of
self defense, evidence of both communicated and
uncommunicated threats made by the deceased
are admissible. They are held admissible as explaining the conduct and apprehension of defendant, the conduct and attitude of deceased,
and as shedding light on who was the aggressor." (Additional cases cited.)
See also C.J.S. Homicide Sec. 222, p. ll38, et seq.,
aml 26 Am. J ur. 389 et seq.
Inasmuch as the Trial Court ruled that the evidence pro.ff ered could be admitted under an exception
tu the hearsay rule, the evidence presented at the trial
~houl<l be examined to determine if sufficient f oundational evidence was presented to allow testimony of the
,·iolent and vicious nature of the deceased.
To qualify under the exception, the evidence must
show that the Appellant had knowledge of the violent
nature of the deceased at the time of the homicide.
At the time the trial court ruled (R450) the record
had aLurnlant evidence of specific instances of the violent
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and vicious nature of the deceased which were knol'.
by the Appellant at the time of the homicide. The A
pellant, the wife of the deceased, and a neighbor, Ardi
vViley, all testified about the incident on April 22, 191i
two weeks prior to the homicide, when the decea 1,
threatened to kill the Appellant. ( R346, 386, 387, 41
417, 435, 460). The testimony of the Appellant abo
that incident was:
"Q. And would you tell the Court what to1
place at that time?

A. "\Vell, Doug walked in and walked out in
the back room som~where, one of back room
and came back into the living room with a han
mer in his hand and told me to get out of J,
house and stay out of his house and that if I
ever seen me again he would kill me." ( R38t
It should be noted that the police came to the hou·
on this occasion ( R346) .
It is clear from the evidence that the Appellm
knew at the time of the homicide that the deceased h:1
violently and viciously slashed up and destroyed ti
clothes of the Appellant on May 9, 1965, the day pri1
to the homicide. The wife of the deceased testified th~
prior to the homicide she told the Appellant that H
deceased had ripped and destroyed his clothes (R3J:
368, 421.)

Further, testimony of the Appellant indicates Ii
knowledge of several other instances which dernoL
strated the violent nature of the deceased. (R405, H
415, 416.) Appellant testifies:
24
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"Q. (.Mr. Lund) Did you have an opportunity
to observe him around his wife and observe his
nature?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And when was this?
A. In April.
Q. Of '65?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you have an opportunity to observe
on that day his nature toward his wife?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what was that?

A. It was quite violent.

Q. Did you know whether or not he had a
reputation for being violent?
A. That is all I have ever heard about the man
is that he is extremely violent and constantly
waving guns arou~d ~at people and threatening
to kill them."
The testimony of the wife of the deceased about the
.\ppellant staying at her home several nights during
the week prior to the homicide, because she was frightened of the deceased, could logically result in the inference that the Appellant was aware of the violent nature
of the deceased toward his wife and that the Appellant
had this knowledge prior to the homicide (R351, 352,
:153, 405). Further, the borrowing of the loaded rifle by
!lie deceased's wife from the Appellant, "to frighten
Doug if he came back again" (R351) "because I was

25

frightened * * * of Doug" (R353) could result in oni.
one conclusion, that the Appellant knew of the viole1,
acts of the deceased which frightened the wife of tl
deceased.
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It is urged that the only conclusion that can I stai
reached from the evidence as set out in detail abm ml
(R416) is that the Appellant had knowledge of U 1 ~P
instances of the violent nature of the deceased prior!
the homicide. The language of the Appellant's testimon suf
is that he knew (R413, 415, 435) or had heard (R4I:1 eri1
415) of other instances of the violence of the deceasea eri1
The Appellant in fact referred to several instances n
same (R415).

From the evidence, the homicide took place on H
llth of J\ilay, 1965 (RIOI) and the Appellant w: IN
arrested on the 14th day of May (R77). During tl1 GI
three days between the homicide and the arrest, tlr
Appellant was hiding out (R428, 429). After the arres: L
the Appellant was in jail or confined in the state prisrn y
(R68, 69, 77). It is urged that the instances of th gn
]JOJ
violent nature of the deceased testified to by the Appe!
llll]
lant (ll415) by necessity had to be knowledge obtaint1 of
prior to the homicide, because after that time he had Ii'
opportunity ·whatever. It is submitted that in consider
ing the evidence and the record as a whole, the only con· Ille
clusion that can be reached is that the Appellant did li lac
fact know of the violent nature of the deceased prio' th(
to the homicide.
The Appellant had subpoenaed and available n
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,ritHesses, five Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs and
let, two Justices of the Peace of Salt Lake County, Utah
tl (R18-31) to testify as to the particular instances inrnh,ing the violent nature of the deceased which in1 stauces ·were referred to by the Appellant (R415). The
1
rnling of the Court prohibited their testimony on the
)0\
U 1~ppellant's behalf.

)11]

r!

It is submitted that the testimony on record was
on sufficient foundational evidence to allow the proffered
m eridence, and by denying the proffered proof of the
sea eridence the Trial Court erred.

in

POINT IV

H
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVm ING AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEtli GREE MURDER.
tlr
es:
The Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred
Ly giving the instruction on Murder in the Second Desot
th gree because the elements of that charge were not supported by evidence during the trial. The burden of proof
pe!
imposed on the State to prove each element of the crime
[ltl
of Murder in the Second Degree wholly failed.
Ii'

The discussion and case citations set out in the argu011· lllent of Point I of this brief discusses in detail the total
I li lack of proof on several of the elements necessary to find
'io the Appellant guilty of lVIurder in the Second Degree.

!er

1

The weight of authority provides that in the ab;r·nce of evidence to prove any element of the crime
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charged, the trial court should not give an instructii
on that particular crime. See the annotations in 26 Ar
J ur. 546 et seq.

('1

In the case of .Mills v. Colorado, 362 Pac.2d l.i.
the court allowed (cases cited) : State v. Carabaj:.
26 New Mexico 348, 183 Pac. 406, 17 ALR 1091
Arrejo v. People, 134 Colorado 344, 304 Pac. 2d 63

"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, 11
feel it necessary to point out generally it is in p<
proper to instruct on a degree of homicide n re
sustained by the evidence." (Further cases cited as
In the case of Tate v. People, 125 Colorado j2:
24<7 Pac. 2d 665, the court remanded the case for rehear
ing on a verdict of _Murder in the Second Degree, citin.
as error the Trial Court's giving an instruction on Mu:
der in the First Degree when the evidence did not sw
tain the charge. The court held:

s
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" * * * with equal force we have stated that n Ill

Trial Court should not instruct on a degree
homicide not sustained by the evidence. (Ca1t
cited.) * * * \Vhen this Court holds in a majorit
of cases that a Trial Court should not instruct r
a degree of homicide not sustained by the ei
dence, then in this case, we must say that by sue
an instruction here, error obtains. The fact tlu
the Trial Court gave an instruction on Fir•
Degree Murder when the essential elements '.rer
missing in the proof, it must be said that the .Jllf
could easily infer by the giving of such an instrut
tion that these elements were present in the CH''
It presents a fertile field for discussion arno1
jurors not skilled in legal technique, for fimlll'
a welcome opportunity to compose differe11 1'
and agree upon a compromise verdict. * * * "
1
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In Brooker v. State, 312 Pac. 2d 189, the Criminal
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Court of Appeals held:
"If evidence in a prosecution for homicide fails
to prove any element of murder, Trial Court
should not give an instruction on Murder but
confine the instructions to the degree of homicide
which the evidence tends to establish."

It is submitted that the argument of Point I clearly
points out that the State failed to prove, beyond a
JI
reasonable doubt, the element of "malice aforethought,"
as charged, and further places severe doubt that the
i: State proved it was either "felonious" or "unlawful"
ar because the evidence clearly established that the Appellant acted in self-defense. On this basis, it was clearly
11.
f error by the Trial Court and very prejudicial to the
, Appellant to have the Court give an instruction on
1
Murder in the Second Degree where the evidence presented at the trial did not establish the necessary elements of that crime.
11

it

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence subiC mitted at the trial was not sufficient to support a verdict
w of Murder in the Second Degree, and, further, that the
~r Trial Court erred by admitting hearsay evidence and
r disallowing evidence of the deceased's character and
11
reputation for violence.

I,

Respectfully submitted,
FRANCIS C. LUND
Attorney for Appellant
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